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ABSTRACT
This paper studies a special class of differential information games
with pre-play communication — games with "cheap play." We consider
problems in which there are several rounds of payoff-irrelevant publicly
observable choice (or discussion) of actions, followed by a final round in
which actions are binding and payoff relevant. A natural focal subset of
equilibria of such games is one that consists of equilibria involving no
regret. In such equilibria, actions chosen in the cheap play phase remain
optimal even after private information is updated and are chosen again at
the binding stage. We show that there are several alternative ways of
formalizing the notion of sequential equilibria with no regret and present
an argument for selecting one such formulation. The arguments rely on the
interpretation of mixed strategies and on the specification of
regret-freeness off the equilibrium path. We provide a complete
characterization of the set of regret-free sequential equilibrium outcomes
of the extended game in terms of a "posterior implementability" criterion
applied to the underlying static game.
JEL Classification: 026
Address correspondence to:
John P. Conley
Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
330 Commerce West
1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820

1. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this paper is on an important sub-class of games with
pre-play communication — games with cheap play. We consider problems in
which there are several rounds of payoff-irrelevant publicly observable
choice (or discussion) of actions, followed by a final round in which
actions are binding and payoff relevant. If there is differential
information among the players, such "cheap play" in the earlier rounds
conveys information. The crucial aspect of cheap play that sets it apart
from other forms of pre-play communication is that natural focal equilibria
of the resulting game are those involving no regret. In such equilibria,
actions chosen in the cheap play phase remain optimal even after private
information is updated and are chosen again when the time comes to make a
binding commitment.
We develop a formal model of the sequential game induced by the
imposition of rounds of cheap play to an underlying simultaneous-move game.
The objective is to identify the appropriate formalization of equilibria
involving no regret. We present seven alternative candidates. These
involve various types of stationarity restrictions on the sequential
equilibria of the induced game. We argue that other definitions will not
differ in any essential way. We make the case for singling one of them out
and provide a simple characterization of the set of sequential equilibrium
outcomes satisfying this form of stationarity.
The definition of the set of equilibrium outcomes of a game with
pre-play communication via non-binding play is potentially complicated.
However, our main theorem shows that regret-free equilibrium outcomes may
be characterized by a set of linear inequalities. The practical
implication of this is that the design of optimal contracts in situations
where such pre-play communication occurs becomes a straightforward
programming problem.
The central theoretical implication of our paper is the establishment
of a link between the appropriate formulation of no regret and an
equilibrium refinement proposed by Green and Laffont (1987). Green and
Laffont's objective is precisely the same as ours — to study the effect of
pre-play rounds of cheap play with no regret. They do not explicitly
analyze the sequential game induced by such pre-play communication; instead
they impose a restriction called posterior implementability on the Bayesian
equilibria of the underlying static game. However, Green and Laffont
speculate that there may be some connection between the perfect equilibria
of the extended game induced by pre-play communication a la Farrell (1982)
and posterior implementability.
Our paper addresses this speculation. We demonstrate an equivalence
between the set of stationary sequential equilibrium outcomes of the game
with cheap play and the set of posterior implementable Bayesian equilibrium
outcomes of the underlying static game. Hence, this paper can be
interpreted as a justification for directly concentrating on the static
game, as Green and Laffont did, without bothering with the messy extended
sequential game. In the absence of such an equivalence argument, an
analysis that rests on a restriction on the Bayesian equilibria of the
static game would be rather troubling.
Before we plunge into the formalities, we shall briefly remark on the
game-theoretic implications of the various formulations of no regret. Of
the seven possible alternatives, we show that four (which involve
regret-freeness off the equilibrium path) are too strong and are therefore
trivial. Of the remaining possibilites, the issue, quite unexpectedly,
reduces to the interpretation that one adopts with regard to mixed
strategies. The "modern" view of Harsanyi (1973) and Aumann (1987) is that
mixed strategies should be treated as an expression of the uncertainty that
other players have about the strategy choice of any given player. This is
in contrast to the "traditional" view that mixed strategies involve players
making decisions on the basis of actual "flips of a coin". We show that
posterior implementability completely characterizes the set of sequential
equilibrium outcomes satisfying a notion of regret-freeness consistent with
the Harsanyi-Aumann viewpoint. The candidates that are consistent with the
traditional viewpoint have no logical relationship with posterior
implementability.
Section 2 contains the basic model. Section 3 presents alternative
ways of formalizing the notion of no regret. Section 4 contains the
results and the final section concludes.
2. THE MODEL
A is a finite set of outcomes, N = {1, 2,..., n) is a set of players,
and 8 is a finite set of states of the world. A state of the world 9 e 8
is a profile (9 ) . Each player i in N is characterized by a list <8
,
i 1€N i
u
,
n
,
M >, which includes:
i i i
a set of possible private observations 8
,
a (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function u.: A x 8 -» R,
a prior probability distribution on 8, tt : 8 -> (0, 1], and
a finite set of moves, M .
i
In the sequel, for any set X , let X = x X , X = X X and given
l i -1 ji€N j€N\U>
x e X , let x s (x ) and x = (x )
i i i i€N -i J j€N\<l>
Also, for any set Y, let
A(Y) denote the set of randomizations over Y. Given a random variable h: X
-» A(Y), we shall, with some abuse of notation, use h[y\ x) to denote the
probability assigned to y e Y by the distribution h{x).
An outcome function g: M -» A specifies an outcome for every profile of
moves. A game {form) T is a list <A, N, M, g>. The strategy space for i
in the game T is the set S = is : 8 -> A(M )}. With slight abuse of
notation, s( •
|
0) and s (»| 9 ) denote the joint probability
distributions induced on M and M by s € S, and s e S , respectively,
-i -i -i
given a realization € 8. Let the function g*s: 8 -> A(/l) be defined by:
for all a € A and <= 8,
g*s(a\ 0) = •
X s(m' | 0)
m'€(m : g ( m) = a >
if 3m such that g{m) = a
othe r wise,
This is the function that specifies the probability distribution
induced on the set of outcomes given the choice of s in the game played in
the state of the world 0,
Every player i updates his/her probability distribution on 8 upon
observing an element of 8 using Bayes' Law. This is summarized by a
posterior probability distribution on 8 , n : 8 -> [0, 1], where n (0)
-l i i
specifies the probability assigned by i to e 8 , given the observation
-i -i
€ 8 .
i 1
The model thus far is assumed to be common knowledge in the sense of
Aumann (1976).
A Bayesian equilibrium of f is a strategy profile s e S that
satisfies:
Vi 6 JV, V6 e 8 , Vs' 6 S , s' 3 (s\ s ),
i i 1 1 i -i
£ £7r(9)g*s(a| 9)u(a, 0) £ £ J] tt (e)g*s'(a | 9)u (a, 9)
9 e8 a€A 9 €8 a€A
-i -1 -1 -i
8 (D 2 S denotes the set of Bayesian equilibria of T, with &{T) =
{g*s: s € & (D> denoting the set of induced Bayesian equilibrium outcomes
of r.
Next, we shall model the following situation. Prior to committing
themselves to moves in the game, the players engage in pre-play
communication. The communication is in the form of "cheap play" — each
player makes or proposes a move for himself/herself with the knowledge that
it can be withdrawn at no cost. We allow for several rounds of such
non-binding and payoff-irrelevant (simultaneous-move) play.
Let T denote the number of rounds of simultaneous-move choices
available to the players such that the choices made from M in the first (T
- 1) rounds are non-binding and payoff-irrelevant. The moves chosen from M
in the 7-th round are binding commitments and determine the final outcome.
The introduction of these rounds yields a cheap play extension of V, and is
Tdenoted T .
Let M denote the t-fold product of M for all t e {1,..., T}. For a
T T
given sequence of play, m e M
,
m(t) is used to denote the profile of
moves chosen in the t-th round. An information set for player i at any t >
1 in the extensive-form game induced by T (referred to in the sequel,
simply, as T ) is characterized by a pair (0,m~)€8 xM" and an
i i
information set for t at t - 1 is, obviously, e s 8 . Let H denote the
x
set of all information sets in T
,
with K identifying the subset of
i
T
information sets that belong to player i. A strategy in T for player i is
a function cr : K -> A(M ) and is given by a sequence (s_)
_
,
where s_ e
S
,
and for all t > 1, s : 8 X M " -> A(M ). Let Z denote the strategy
i 11 ii 6J
space for i in T . A system of beliefs is an n-tuple of functions /3 : 9 x
i
U
T M1 -> [0, 1] such that T (3 (9, m1 ) = 1 for every i € AT, 9 € 9
9 €9 » l
-i -l
and m s U
,_
M . /3 specifies the probability distribution that player I
assigns to 9
,
given his/her information set. Let B denote the space of
such systems of beliefs.
t T
Given a- = (s ) , let the function g*cr: 9 -> L{A) be defined
t=i
by: for all a € A and 9 e 9,
g*cr{a\ 9) = -
£ o-(m'(T)| 9) if 3m such that g(m) = a
m'€{m: g (m) = a >
otherwise,
where <r{m'{T)\ 9) denotes the probability that m' will be played in the
T-th round under the strategy profile c in state 9.
Also, for any m € M
,
for any V € {1 T), if m (£) = m for all11 1 i
t € {!,..., t'}, then we write m as [m ].
A sequential equilibrium of f is a pair (cr, /3) € S x B that
satisfies:
Vi
€ N, Vh = (9
,
m
1
) € K , Vcr" € Z , <r' = (cr*, cr ),11 111 i -i
£ E 0.(8. m^gVUl 9)u (a, 9) ^ E E/3 ^. rnbgVUl 9)u (a, 9]
9 €9 a€A 9 €9 a€A
-1
-I -1-1
where /3 is compatible with the use of Bayes' Law whenever it is applicable.
T T
&_ (T ) Q Z x B denotes the set of sequential equilibria of F , with
g(rT ) = {g*o~. 3/3 e B such that (o\ |3) e ^^W^ denotin§ the set of
T
induced sequential equilibrium outcomes of T .
3. EQUILIBRIA WITH NO REGRET
In this paper, we will concentrate on the subset of sequential
T
equilibria of T that are "regret-free' . Such equilibria have the property
that despite the changes in the beliefs of the players over the rounds of
cheap play, the choices made in the early rounds remain optimal even when
the time to make a binding commitment arrives.
Regret-free equilibria are natural focal points in games with cheap
play. Cheap play is meant to capture the flavor of non-binding negotiation
prior to the making of binding agreements. A player who makes proposals in
the negotiation phase that would be regretted if they were payoff relevant
would not be taken seriously by other players. "Serious" negotiation
requires the use of strategies in the cheap play round that would also be
optimal in the binding round. Thus, some form of stationarity in strategies
over time seems to reflect this notion of no regret. There are many
possible ways to formalize stationarity. Several are presented below.
t T
A sequential equilibrium (cr, /3) is type I-stationary if cr = (s.)
satisfies: Vt
€ {2 T), Vi € N, V0 € 9, Vm1"' € Mt_1 such that m t_1
i i
arises with positive probability in the equilibrium, s (8 , m " ) = s (9 ).
i i i i
A sequential equilibrium (cr, /3) is type I I-stationary if cr = {s )
satisfies: Vt
€ {2,..., T>, Vi € N, V9 6 9, Vm 1"' € M t- \ sHm \ 6,ii I l ' i
10
m ) = 1, provided m = [m ] for some m e M , and s(m I 9 ) > 0.
i i i i I- 1 i
t T
A sequential equilibrium (cr, ft) is type Ill-stationary if cr = (s )
i t=i
satisfies: Vt
€ {2,..., 7*>, Vi € JV, VG e 9, Vmt_1 e Mt_I , sl (9 , mt_1 ) =
i 1 i i
she ).
i i
A sequential equilibrium (cr, 3) is type IV-stationary if cr = (s )
i t = l
satisfies: Vt 6 {2,..., D, Vi € W, VG € 9, Vm
t_1
e Mt_1
,
s
t(m (t - 1)1
i i i i
9
, m ) = 1.
i
t 7
A sequential equilibrium (cr, /3) is type 7-stationary if cr = (s )
i t=i
satisfies: Vt € {2,..., 7}, Vi € JV, VG € 9, Vmt_1 € Mt-\ s^m (1)1 9,
i i i i ' i
m ) = 1.
A sequential equilibrium (cr, /3) is type Vl-stationary if cr = (s )
i t = l
satisfies: Vt
€ {2,..., T), Vi e N, VG € 9, Vm 1
" 1
€ Mt_1
,
s
t
(m(t')| 9,
I i II ' i
m ) = 1, provided t' < t.
t T
A sequential equilibrium (cr, 3) is type Vll-stationary if cr = (s )
satisfies: Vt € {2 T), Vi € A/", V9 € 9, Vmt_1 e Mt_1 , sl(m I 9,
i i i I '
.
1
m ) = 1, provided m = [m ] for some m e M .
i l i i
There are fundamentally two categories of stationary strategies
depending on the interpretation that one gives to mixed strategies. Type I
stationarity characterizes the situation where the players choose a
particular randomization over moves in the first period and choose the same
randomization in every subsequent round, provided there are no deflections
from the equilibrium path. This formulation implies that players choose a
randomization that they will not regret regardless of what information is
acquired during the remaining pre-play communication stages. This
specification of no regret accepts the traditional viewpoint on mixed
stategies which maintains that players actually randomize over alternative
11
actions.
The "modern" viewpoint, advocated by Harsanyi (1973), Aumann (1987),
and others, is that mixed stategies are expressions of players' uncertainty
about other players' actions. Thus, no player actually randomizes over
actions, but for each player such a distribution represents other players'
beliefs about his/her likely strategy choices. A no regret criterion that
accepts this interpretation is captured by Type IJ-stationarity. It
requires that in every round, the players choose the move they made in the
first round, regardless of the information they receive in the interim,
provided that (a) in the past they have chosen the first round move at
every round and (b) the first round choice was on the equilibrium path.
Note that mixtures (which are proxies for the players' beliefs) are
considered only in the first round and subsequently only pure strategies
appear since the uncertainty among the players about each other's moves is
resolved.
Types I and II would seem to be the only natural notions of
stationarity as long as our concern is only about no regret along the
equilibrium path. However, a case can be made for insisting upon
regret-free behavior off the equilibrium path as well. There are many
reasonable alternatives that seem to capture such a notion. We describe
five possibilities.
In Type JJJ-stationarity, players are expected to choose a particular
randomization over moves in the first period and choose the same
randomization in every subsequent round, regardless of the move that is
actually played in each round. Such a move may or may not occur with
positve probability in equilibrium. In Type IV-stationarity, players
choose to play the move that they had chosen in the previous round,
12
regardless of the information conveyed by earlier choices. In Type
F-stationarity, in every round, the players choose the move they made in
the first round, regardless of the information they receive in the interim.
In Type Ki-stationarity, at any round players choose one of the moves
chosen in the past. Finally, in Type FiT-stationarity, in every round of
play, the players choose the move they made in the first round, regardless
of the information they receive in the interim, provided in the past they
have chosen the first round move at every round. Note that in all these
cases, the move that is being repeated in subsequent rounds may or may not
occur with positive proabability in equilibrium.
We could probably add many other specifications of behavior off the
equilibrium path. We show that this is irrelevant in the next section.
Other specifications would not differ from the ones presented here in any
essential way.
4. RESULTS
Given the wealth of alternative no regret criteria, it is important to
identify the one that is the most desirable from both practical and
game-theoretic standpoints. In this section, we shall identify one such
criterion and provide a complete characterization of the set of sequential
equilibrium outcomes that arises under this restriction.
At the outset, we shall argue that Types IV-VII, which restrict
behavior off the equilibrium path as well, are undesirable
characterizations of regret-freeness. The restrictions that they impose on
the set of sequential equilibria turn out to be too strong. This is the
13
message of the following proposition. Needless to say, Types IV-VII do not
exhaust the set of possible variations on definitions of stationarity off
the equilibrium path. However, the argument given below can be adapted to
apply to any alternative definition which requires disequilibrium moves
made in the cheap play rounds to be repeated in the binding round.
Theorem 1: Cenerically, given T > 1, &V (TT ) = for v = IV, V, VI, VII.
V T
Proof: We shall give the argument for T = 2, in which case & [F ) is
identical across v = IV VII. The arguments for arbitrary T are
analogous.
Suppose 8 is the state of the world and in round 1, m has been played.
By Type y-stationarity of the equilibrium strategy, {v = IV,..., VII) m
must be played again in round 2. By sequential rationality, m must be an
i
optimal move against m for all i € N. Since this must hold for every m e
M, each m € M must be a best response to every m € M for all i € N,
i.e. each m € M must yield the same utility to any player i. Hence, the
game in any given state of the world must be trivial and a slight
perturbation of payoffs would destroy the equilibrium.
Given that the remaining choices are Types I-III, the main objective
of this paper is to provide a strong case for selecting Type II
stationarity as the appropriate formulation of no regret. This is based on
both game-theoretic and practical arguments.
From a game-theoretic standpoint, we argue against Types J and III as
appropriate formulations of regret-freeness. The question reduces to the
preferred interpretation of mixed strategies. The traditional view of
randomization that these types embody is that players would base important
14
decisions on the flip of a coin or some other randomization device. This,
as Aumann (1989) puts it, is difficult to swallow. Following Savage
(1954), we take the view (espoused by Harsanyi (1973), Aumann (1987) and
others) that randomness is not a physical act; a mixed strategy for player
i is simply an expression of the ignorance that other players have about
Vs decisions.
Of course, a case can be made for the traditional view. For instance,
poker players or auditors and quality inspectors are known to choose
randomizations to avoid becoming predictable. In general, such
justifications would not apply and, moreover, run into conceptual
difficulties. Thus, the modern view of mixed strategies supports the
choice of Type II stationarity.
The second argument in favor of Type II stationarity is that the
resulting set of equilibrium outcomes has a simple characterization. The
practical implications of the characterization is that we need not be
concerned with the messy extended cheap play game. Instead it is
sufficient to focus on a subset of the Bayesian equilibria of the
underlying static game.
This characterization is in terms of a simple condition on the set of
Bayesian equilibria of the underlying static game T and is called posterior
implementability. It was introduced by Green and Laffont (1987). This
notion is defined below. For all i e N and s € S, define the function rc :
i
8 x M -» [0, 1] by
s {m 9 )tt (9)
s,„ , —I — I ' — i i
n (9, m
i
Y s (m |9* )tt (9' , 8
9*
€0 "' -' "' ' - 1 i
- i - 1
15
A Bayesian equilibrium s is posterior implementable if
V6 € 8, Vm € M such that s{m\ 9) > 0, Vi € N, Vm' e M ,
1
i i
7 7r
s
(e, m)u (g(m), 9) 2: y tts (9, m)u(g(m', m ), 9)
9 €8 9 €9
-i -i -i -i
PI
& (D £ s denotes the set of posterior implementable Bayesian
equilibria of T, with 6Pl [T) = {g*s: s € £PI (r)} denoting the set of
Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of f satisfying posterior implementability.
Two theorems follow. The first shows that Type II stationarity is
characterized by the posterior implementability criterion. The second
shows that the Types I and III have no logical relationship with posterior
implementability.
Theorem 2: £n (rT ) = gPI(D for all T > 1.
Proof: The theorem is a consequence of the following lemmata.
In the proofs below, if m <= M and s € S are such that m = [m] for
some m
€
M with s(m\ 9) > 0, then we shall say that (m , m, s) satisfy
Property A.
Lemma 1: gPI(D £ & l\rT ).
Pi
Proof of Lemma h Choose s e 6 (D. Also, choose cr e E such that cr =
(s ) with
t=i
(a) s = s,
(b) for all t e {2, ..., T}, for all 9 € 8, for all m
t_1
e Mt-\ s^ml
9, m ) = 1 if (m , m, s) satisfy Property A, and
(c) for all 9
€ 8, and all m
_1
€ M " , such that (m ~\ m, s) does
16
T T—
1
1
not satisfy Property A for any m, s (•
|
9, m ) = s (• | 9).
Define /3 e IB such that it satisfies:
for all i 6 N, for all 9 € 8, for all m e M ,
if there exists m e M such that (m , m, s) satisfy Property A,
/3 (9, m
i
otherwise,
s
1 (m I 9 )7r (9)
t-K -i -i ' -i I
V s m 9* re (0* , 9 )
«t ^ "I -1 ' -i i -1 i9 €9
-l - i
(3 (9, m
t_l
) = 71 (9).
i i
In words, along the equilibrium path, the players use strategy profile
s in period 1, and subsequently repeat the move chosen in the first period
with probability one. Correspondingly, beliefs are updated by an
application of Bayes' Law. Out of equilibrum, players' beliefs are
identical to the original posteriors and players use the strategy profile
s.
By definition of S (D, for all m € M ' and m 6 M such that (m
m, s) satisfy Property A, for all i € N, for all 9 € 8, for all m € M
,
i i
Y j3(9, [m])u(g(m), 9) * T 0(8, [m])u (g(m , m ), 9).
~ r~. 1 I „ /-, i i -i i9 €8 9
€8
-i -I -I -1
Moreover, since s e & (D, for all m € M such that m * [m]
s
for any m € M with s(m
|
9) > 0, we have for all i € N, for all 9 € 8, for
all m e M
,
i i
17
t-1,
V Y s (m e )& e, m )u g(m , 9) ^
m €M 8 €8
-i -I -i -1
1 , I „ x~ /~ t-1,7 7] s (m 9 p 9, m u igim , m ), 9]^ **_
-1 -1 ' -1 i 1 -i i
m <=M 9 €0
-i -i -i -i
By definition, (o\ 8) e g^^T ) and satisfies Type IJ-stationarity.
PI II T
By construction, g*s = g*cr. Thus, 6 {D Q & (f ).
Lemma 2: &U (rT ) Q gPI (D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Choose (cr, 8) e £_ _(r ), with cr = (s ) . By
— — SxB t=i
sequential rationality, and Type Jl-stationarity, for all i € N, for all 9.
e 8, for all m € M, such that s im\ 9) > 0, for all m e M, [1] must
i ' i i
hold:
£ 8(8, [m])u (g(m), 9) a J] 8(8, [m])u (g(m , m ), 0). [1]
e €8 ' * 8 ee '
i -i i
-i -i -L -i
But by Type II-stationarity,
8^9, [m])
s
1 (m I 9 )7i (9)
- i -i ' - i i
7 s
1 (m |8* )tt (8*
, 8 )
.
€Q -l -i
1
-i i -i I
-i - l
= [s
1 (m I 8 )n (9)}K(m ),
-i -i ' -i i -i
where Kim ) is a constant term.
Hence, by [1] the posterior implementability criterion is met. Next,
we need to check that gn (rT ) Q &(T).
By substituting in [1] and multiplying through by [Kim )] , for all
-i
i 6 N, for all 8 e 0, for all m e M such that s l {m\ 8) > 0, for all m €
i i
'
i
M
, [2] must hold:
i
18
T s
1 (m I 9 )n (9)u (g(m), 9) £
_
—1 —l ' -i i i
9 €9
-i -l
Y s
1 (m I 9 hr (e)u(g(m , m ),0). [2]
„
u
- -l -i ' -li l -i l
9 €8
-i -i
Since [2] is true for each m € M , such that s {m 9 ) > 0, for
-1
-1
-1 -i ' -1
all i € N, for all 9 € 8 , for all m e M such that s (m I 9 ) > 0, and
i i 11 i i 1 i
for all m. e M., [3] must hold:
Y y s
1 (m I 9 )n (e)u (g(m), 9) ^
^
„ - -i -i ' -i i i
m 6M 9 €8
-i -1 -1 -1
y y s
1 [m I 9 )n (e)u(g(m , in), 9). [3]
„ _ —1 —1 * —1 I i -i i
m €M 9 €8
-i -i -i -i
Thus, s s & (D. By Type Il-stationarity, g*cr = g*s . Hence & (f )
pi
£ g (D.
I TTheorem 3: There is no logical relationship either between & (T ) and
&
P1
(T) or between &Ul(TT) and &
P1(D for any T > 1.
Proof: The following examples are proof of the proposition above. The
IT PI
first example shows that 8 (T ) does not contain 8 (D, and the second
example shows that the reverse containment may not be expected either. By
construction, in the examples below, every move is assigned positive
probability in equilibrium. Hence, the argument would hold for the case of
III T
& (T ) as well. Any non-genericity in the payoffs is purely for the
purposes of keeping the examples as simple as possible and is not critical
for the arguments.
19
Example 1:
Consider the following game, I\
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The players are labelled 1 and 2 and they choose from the sets {U, D)
and {L, R) respectively. Player 2 has private information; her set of
possible private observations is {0 , 0'}. Player 1 is uninformed and has
a single possible observation. Player l's posterior distribution on 8 is
71 (0 ) = tt (0') = -.12 12 2
Trivially, player 2 is indifferent among her strategies. Consider the
following Bayesian equilibrium s:
s (U\ ) = -.
1
'
1 2
s (L\ ) = -; s (L\ 0') = -.
2 ' 2 3 2 ' 2 3
Both L and R are assigned positive probability by the equilibrium.
Conditional upon the observation of L, the probability that player 1
2
assigns to is - and in the event that R is observed, the probability
assigned to is -. Upon observing either one of player 2's moves, the
payoff to player 1 from choosing either U or D is — . Hence, the Bayesian
equilibrium given above is also posterior implementable.
The equilibrium s induces the following distribution on the outcome
space in each state.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
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Suppose that there exists a Type /-stationary strategy in the game T
,
~t T
denoted cr = (s ) , that also yields the same distribution on outcomes.
t=l
By Type J-stationarity, s must satisfy:
s(U\ e )
i ' i
s(D\ )
l * l
\jfr-\ V s (Rl e ) J
1 1
3 6
1 1
3 6
s
l
[U\ )
l ' l
s(D\ e )
i ' i
\~s l (L\ 0'
2 ' 2
s(R\
'12 1 16 3
1 1
6 3
The unique solution to the equations above is s = s. However, cr is
not an equilibrium strategy. Suppose that player 2 chooses to play L in
the first round. Player l's payoff from playing U in the second round is:
-(-(5) + ±(Z)) + V(0) + -(4)) = 25,
3 3 3 3 3 3 9
which is strictly greater than the payoff from playing D in the second
round, given by:
-(-(4) + -{0)) + -(-(2) + -(5)) = --.
3 3 3 3 3 3 9
The strategy cr is not a best response to cr for the case 7 = 2. It
can be checked that the same conclusion would be obtained for arbitrary T
1). Thus, t?
PI(D is not a subset of Sir 1").
Example 2:
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Consider the following game, T.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
The players are labelled 1 and 2 and they choose from the sets {U, D)
and {L, R} respectively. Player 1 has private information; his set of
possible private observations is {0 , 0'}. Player 2 is uninformed. Player
2's posterior distribution on 8 is n (0 ) = n id') = -.K 12 12 12
Trivially, player 2 is indifferent among her strategies. Consider the
following Bayesian equilibrium s:
s (U\ 6 ) = -; siV\ 9*) = -.
1 ' 1 3 1 ' 1 3
s U| ) = -.
2 ' 2 2
t T
It is easily checked that cr = (s = s) is a sequential equilibrium
strategy profile (which satisfies Type I-stationarity, by definition) as
well. For any T > 1, T - 1 rounds of cheap play do not invalidate the
best-response property of either player's strategy.
The equilibrium cr induces the following distribution on the outcome
space in each state.
[INSERT FIGURE 4]
Let s e S be a strategy profile in the game T.
distribution over outcomes given above, it must satisfy:
If s must yield the
s (I/I )
1 ' 1
r~ s (li © )
2 ' 2
s (R\ )
2 ' 2 3
1
1
3
1
s (D\ )
l ' l
1
6
1
6
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s (u\ e')
i ' i 2 ' 2
S (R\ 9 )
2 ' 2
1
6
1
1
6
s (Dl 9')
l ' l
3 3
The unique solution to the equations above is s = s. However, s is
not posterior implementable. Suppose that player l's observation is 9 and
he observes player 2's play of R. Player l's payoff from playing U clearly
dominates the payoff from playing D, given this observation.
Thus, S (f ) is not a subset of & (D.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we study pre-play communication via the announcements
of moves that are non-binding and payoff irrelevant. We argue that
sequential equilibria of the induced extended game that satisfy a criterion
of no regret are focal. We find that there are several ways to formalize
the notion of no regret and present an argument for choosing one of them.
Our main result gives a characterization of the set of regret-free
sequential equilibrium outcomes in terms of a posterior implementability
restriction on the equilibria of the underlying static game. This notion
of regret-freeness is consistent with the modern interpretation of
strategies proposed by Harsanyi (1973) and Aumann (1987). Finally, we show
that notions of regret-freeness consistent with the traditional view of
mixed strategies have no logical connection with posterior
implementability.
In Chakravorti (1990), a special case of the analysis given earlier is
applied. In that paper, the equivalence between the stationary pure
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strategy Bayesian equilibria of the extended game and pure strategy
posterior implementable equilibria of the static game is considered. Note
that all of the definitions of stationarity given in this paper are
equivalent when attention is restricted to pure strategies and to
regret-freeness only in parts of the game that are on the equilibrium path.
We close with two observations.
First, a common theme underlying the various stationarity notions
considered in this paper is that there is no regret at every round on the
equilibrium path — "uniform" no regret. One could, of course, conceive of
other notions that convey regret-freeness in "cycles". For example, for
the first three rounds, players experiment and subsequently repeat the
moves made three periods earlier; or the players oscillate between two
equilibria in alternate rounds, etc. We leave such issues open for future
research. Our intention in this paper is to focus entirely on "uniform" no
regret without exploring the Pandora's box of variations on cyclical
definitions.
Second, we note that the equivalence result given in the previous
section may continue to hold even in the case of games without completely
cheap play. In Chakravorti and Conley (1991), a theory of play with random
deadlines for submitting a binding action is introduced. In the current
context, this would mean that there is some positive probability (less than
one) with which the play in the preliminary rounds is not cheap, i.e. the
game could be terminated and any moves made would be used to compute
payoffs. This rules out "babbling" sequential equilibria of the extended
game and gives players an incentive to "negotiate in good faith." We
speculate that the result of this paper would be unaffected by the presence
of such a possibility.
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